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Article 10

THE VALIDITY OF EXCLUSIVE PRIVILEGES
IN THE PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT SECTOR
I. Introduction
A. The Scope of the Issue
An increasing number of states have statutorily adopted a policy of recognizing an exclusive bargaining representative in the public employment sector."
Because the adoption of an exclusive recognition policy casts upon the state the
dual role of regulator and employer,2 the public employment sector is inherently
marked by unique problems regarding a minority union's organizational and
representational rights vis-a-vis a majority union's contractual exclusive privileges.
To illustrate the social, statutory, and constitutional considerations which create
difficulty in defining and protecting minority union's rights, this note will focus
on the legality of granting solely to an exclusive teachers' bargaining representative certain contractual privileges related to the internal communications system of a school.
Does the scope of permissible exclusivity encompass a majority union's privileges to use bulletin boards, faculty mailboxes, school equipment (for example,
mimeograph machines), and the school building while an employer denies these
same privileges to a minority union? Do these exclusive privileges constitute unlawful support or interference by the school board? Does the denial of these
privileges violate minority union members' first amendment free speech and
association rights? Does such discrimination between the majority and minority
unions violate the fourteenth amendment equal protection clause? A determination of the validity of exclusive rights involves first deciding what body of law
is applicable (labor law, constitutional law or both), then appropriately applying
that law within the context of potentially conflicting public policy considerations.
B. Applicable Law
The issue of the validity of granting exclusive rights to a majority teachers'
union obviously presents an issue of labor relations between employer and employee. When confronted with a minority teachers' union's complaint that a
denial of special privileges involving the use of school buildings for meetings
free of charge, use of school bulletin boards and teachers' mailboxes except during election campaigns, and a dues check-off denied to the union members their
first amendment rights of free speech and association, the Colorado district court
in Local 858 of A.F. of T. v. School District No. Is relied primarily on labor
law. The court established the context for its inquiry in declaring:
1 For a compilation of this statutory authority see Note. The Privilege of Exclusive Recognition and Minority Union Rights in Public Employment, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 1004 1, at
1004-05 nn.2-9 (1970); 1 CGH LAB. L. REP., STATE LAWS f 40,355 (1971).
2 Eisner, First Amendment Right of Association for Public Employee Union Members,
20 LAs. L.J. 438, 442 '(1969); Note, supra note 1, at 1006.
3 314 F. Supp. 1069 (D. Colo. 1970).
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This case presents a problem of labor relations, and although the problem
is in the context of public employment, this does not alter its essential character. Plaintiffs are a labor union and its officials and members, and they
are seeking to utilize only those internal channels of school communication
which are not traditionally of a public nature for the purpose of furthering
the goals of their union. The privilege of dues check off which they claim
is peculiarly a matter of labor relations. Thus, we do not accept plaintiffs'

characterization of the issue as one of alleged impairment of broad First
Amendment rights.The court did recognize, however, that because the employer is a public
entity, the case "presents a departure from classic labor law."' Then the court
went to great pains to distinguish "the exercise of those rights peculiarly involved
in the employer-employee relationship from broader rights of speech and association."6 This effectively culminated in rendering the constitutional claims as
"nothing more than appealing rhetoric" and extending the private employer's
negative duty to treat with no other union than the exclusive representative to
public employers as well' so as to uphold the validity of the enumerated special
privileges. Thus, although the court observed the public nature of the employment involved here, it failed to acknowledge that this necessarily places the inquiry into a labor law issue in a constitutional context.
In striking down a school regulation prohibiting teachers from circulating
a petition during lunch periods on school premises, the California Supreme Court
in Los Angeles Teachers Union v. Los Angeles City Board of Education' explained the essential difference between private and public employment by noting
that "under ordinary circumstances a private employer is not subject to the First
Amendment."' The absence of any reported decision holding that a private
employer must permit similar activity on his premises was, therefore, neither
surprising nor dispositive of the issue before the court.'" In light of these different
views a thorough analysis of the problem requires inquiry into both labor and
constitutional law considerations.
II. Labor Law Considerations
Although it is not sufficient to impose only labor law principles in the disposition of a public labor controversy, the body of private labor law is an
established source to which one can easily and logically turn" in an initial analysis
of the validity of exclusive privileges. This is an especially appropriate starting
point in light of the striking similarities between state public employment statutory

4 Id. at 1075..
5 Id. at 1074.

6 Id.
7 Id. at 1075.

8
9
10

71 Cal. 2d 551, 455 P.2d 827, 78 Cal. Rptr. 723 (1969).
Id. at 564-65, 455 P.2d at 835-36, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 731-32.
Id. at 564. 455 P.2d at 835, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 731.
11 D. WOLLETT & R. CHANIN, THE LAW AND PMACTICE oF
6:1-6:4 (BNA 1970).
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provisions and the National Labor Relations Act provisions." The relevant
provisions of the NLRA are § 7 which establishes rights to union organization,
independence, and maintenance and §§ 8(a) (1)-8(a) (3) which make it an unfair labor practice for an employer to interfere with the exercise of § 7 rights, to
interfere with the formation or administration of a union or contribute support
to it, and to discriminate among unions so as to encourage or discourage union
membership.'
The decisional law has clearly established that employer interference and
support are to be distinguished from mere permissible cooperation with a union.
The leading case announcing this concept of cooperation is Chicago Rawhide
Manufacturing Co. v. NLRB. 4 In that case the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit found mere cooperation by an employer in permitting
employees to hold elections of committees on company premises and time and
to post election notices on bulletin boards, in providing for a nondeduction in
salary for time spent on committee business, and in making financial contributions to the Recreation Committee. The court in rejecting the allegation that
these activities constituted violations of § 8(a) (1) and 8(a) (2) set forth in an
often cited passage its concept of cooperation:
These two Sections are designed to prevent the employer from having
any influence (except 'by free speech) over unions or the employees' choice
thereof. "Support" is proscribed because, as a practical matter, it cannot be
separated from influence. A line must be drawn, however, between support and cooperation. Support, even though innocent, can be indentified
because it constitutes at least some degree of control or influence. Cooperation only assists the employees or their bargaining representative in carrying
out their independent intention. If this line between cooperation and support is not recognized, the employer's fear of accusations of domination may
defeat the principal purpose of the Act, which is cooperation between management and labor.. .i
These acts do no more than evidence the presence of potential means
for interference and support, a possibility that is always present to some
degree in an employer-employee relationship. But, without evidence of the
realization of that potential, they do not furnish a substantial factual basis
for an unfair labor practice finding.
The acts complained of show only laudable cooperation with the
employees' organization, which represented a majority of the employees,
6
rather than interference or support ....
As a result of the cases following Chicago Rawhide, the concept of cooperation is liberally applied to encompass a wide variety of miscellaneous privileges
12 Compare, e.g., Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) §§ 7, 8(a) (1)-(3),
29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(a)(1)-(3) (1970) [hereinafter referred to and cited as NLRA], with
IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 28-4556(a), 28-4557(a) (1)-(3) (Burns Cum. Supp. 1973) ; MIcH. STAT.
ANN. §§ 17.455(9), (10) (1968), as amended, § 17.455(10)(1) (Current Material 1973);
Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 111.70(2), (3) (a) (1)-(2) (1974).
13 NLRA §§ 7,8(a)(1)-(3), 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(a)(1)-(3) (1970).
14 221 F.2d 165 '(7th Cir. 1955).
15 Id. at 167.
16 Id. at 170.
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granted a majority union and activities by an employerY Apparently a complainant in order to establish that an employer has crossed the boundary line

between cooperation and support in violation of § 8 of the NLRA must produce
evidence which rather blatantly displays employer domination or support
designed to interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the free exercise of their
rights to choose and change their bargaining representative.'
A. Employer Motivation
Case law suggests at least three possible factors which may limit the scope
of cooperation in the context of exclusive privileges. The first of these is the
motivation of the employer in negotiating and promulgating rules and regulations whose enforcement provides special rights for the exclusive bargaining agent.
For example, although the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit held in NLRB v. Post Publishing Co.'9 that a course of conduct whereby
an employer permitted the bargaining union to hold meetings on business premises, to print notices on the employer's machines, and to retain a portion of annual
profits from the cafeteria and vending machines constituted a form of cooperation, it conditioned its holding by noting the absence of any showing of employer
motivation indicating domination or support designed to interfere with the
employees' rights to choose and change their representative." The Board in
Crompton-Shenandoah Co.2 commented on the limiting effect a showing of
motivation could have on a question of cooperation:
If these instances of clerical aid had occurred in a context of other forms of
assistance revealing an intent to aid Fibre Workers Associated . . . or to
discriminate against another labor organization, they might then be conillegal assistance by virtue of being part of an overall pattern of
sidered as
22
conduct.
A showing of motivation also has been used to mitigate the literal application of
§ 8(b) (2) of the NLRA by qualifying as a defense to charges of union-induced
discrimination."
Motivation is especially significant in the public sector where the right to
form and join union organizations is a recognized first amendment24 as well as
a common statutory right. When action is justified by a state employer as only
17

See, e.g., Hotpoint Co. v. NLRB, 289 F.2d 683 (7th Cir. 1961); Coppus Engineering

Corp. v. NLRB, 240 F.2d 564 (1st Cir. 1957); Heston Corp., 175 N.L.R.B. 96 (1969).
18 NLRB v. Post Publishing Co., 311 F.2d 565 (7th Cir. 1962); see, e.g., Duquesne Univ.
of the Holy Ghost, 198 N.L.R.B.-, 81 L.R.R.M. 1091 (1972).
19 311 F.2d 565 (7th Cir. 1962).
20 Id. at 569.
21 135 N.L.R.B. 694 (1962) (emphasis added).
22 Id. at 697.

23 Philadelphia Typographical Union No. 2, 189 N.L.R.B. 829 (1971); under discussion
in this case was "that portion of § 8 (b)'(2) which makes it an unfair labor practice for a union
'... to discriminate against an employee with respect to whom membership in such organization has been denied or terminated on some ground other than his failure to tender the periodic
dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership; .. ."' Id.
24 314 F. Supp. at 1074; Eisner, supra note 2.
25 See Note, supra note 1, at 1008 nn.22-24.
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incidentally restrictive of these rights, a careful investigation should be made to
insure that the employer is not using the form of apparently permissible cooperation to disguise an invalid purpose in attempting to dampen legitimate rival union
organization and activity.2"
B. Labor Peace
A second limitation on the application of the cooperation concept to the
special privileges issue is rooted in the purpose of the NLRA" The desire to
encourage and sustain labor harmony gave birth in part to the enunciation of the
cooperation concept.2" Fear of destroying an established amiable employeremployee relationship led the courts and the Board to expand the boundaries of
cooperation.29
The need for labor harmony is arguably more compelling in the public
employment sector."0 But to the extent that the evidence fails to support a forecast of a reasonable likelihood of substantial disruption,"' the line between cooperation and unlawful support can and should be drawn at an earlier stage. Otherwise, the risk is increased that competitive union organizational activity will be
dampened which would run afoul of the declared purposes of the NLRA."2
This line of argument is drawn in part from Republic Aviation Corp. v.
NLRB"3 and NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co. 4 which are cited in NLRB v.
Challenge-Cook Brothers of Ohio, Inc.5 as standing for the proposition that an
employer cannot interfere with employees' rights to distribute union literature
and solicit union interest on company premises during nonworking time absent
a demonstration that unusual circumstances exist which make some limitation
necessary to maintain management, production, or discipline. This principle was
8
articulately applied in NLRB v. Mid-States Metal Products, Inc."
in striking
down a contractual waiver of employees' rights to distribute materials and solicit
in organizing. The court reasoned:
26 Eisner, supra note 2, at 443.
27 NLRA § 1,29 U.S.C. § 141 (1970).
28 E.g., 221 F.2d at 167.
29 See note 17 supra.
30 See Kennedy & Johnson, Public and Private Employment-A Double Standard, 29 FED.
B.J. 111, 112, IZO (1969).
31 This test was established in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) as the standard to be met by school officials in order to justify
prohibition on school premises of students' free speech. See text accompanying notes 56-57,
77-78 infra. Application of the same test in the public labor sector offers an appropriate standard in determining when distribution and solicitation rights can be limited. A similar test is
implied in private labor law principles. See text accompanying notes 33-37 infra.
32 See NLRB v. Mid-States Metal Products, Inc., 403 F.2d 702, 704, 706 (5th Cir. 1968).
The court at 706 quotes with approval the following portion of Judge Kiley's dissent in NLRB
v. Gale Products, 337 F.2d 390, 392 (7th Cir. 1964):
The right of freedom to organize belongs to dissidents as well as the bargaining
agent, and limiting its exercise by no-solicitation agreements, as the one before us,
tends to smother competitive union organizational activity and accordingly militates
against the purposes of the Act.
33 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
34 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
35 374 F.2d 147, 153 (6th Cir. 1967).
36 403 F.2d 702 "(5th Cir. 1968).
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Where union and employee interests are one it can fairly be assumed
that employee rights will not be surrendered except in return for bargainedfor concessions from the employer of benefit to employees. But the rationale
of allowing waiver by the union disappears where the subject matter waived
goes to the heart of the right of employees to change their bargaining representative, or to have no bargaining representative, a right with respect to
which the interests of the union and employees may be wholly adverse.
Solicitation and distribution of literature on plant premises are important
elements in giving full play to the right of employees to seek displacement
of an incumbent union. We cannot presume that the union, in agreeing to
bar such activities, does so as a bargain for securing other benefits for the
employees and not from the self-interest it has in perpetuating itself as
bargaining representative.-7
The court viewed the contractual provision as stripping the employees of fundamental rights guaranteed by the NLRA.38
C. The Bargaining Function
Behind this reasoning is a recognition of the difference between a union's
role as the exclusive bargaining agent and its role as a rival to a minority
competitor." This introduces the third limiting factor on the application of the
cooperation concept. The difference between these dual roles requires that
privileges granted to a majority union be directly related to the exclusive collective
bargaining function and not merely to the majority union's self-perpetuation
and entrenchment. This limiting factor on the expansive concept of cooperation was clearly defined by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Board of School
Directors v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission:
Those rights or benefits which are granted exclusively to the majority
representative, and thus denied to minority organizations, must in some
rational manner be related to the functions of the majority organization in
its representative capacity, and must not be granted to entrench such
organization as the bargaining representative. 40
The court noted that the validity of the exclusive use of school bulletin boards and
teachers' mailboxes was not on appeal before it but that the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission (WERC) had determined and the circuit court had
affirmed that insofar as the use of the physical facilities of the school was related
to normal union activities, the privileges had to be extended to the minority
union if granted to the majority. 1
The Michigan Labor Mediation Board adopted the WERO's decision.37 Id. at 705.
38 Accord, NLRB v. Magnavox Co. of Tenn., -U.S.-, 94 S. Ct. 1099 (1974). This
case adopts the rationale of Mid-States and the Board's decision in Gale Products, 142 N.L.R.B.
1246 (1963), overruled, 337 F.2d 390 (7th Cir. 1964).

39 Note, supra note 1, at 1006-07.

40 42 Wis. 2d 637, 649, 168 N.W.2d 92, 97 '(1969) (emphasis in original).

41 Id. at 642 n.3, 168 N.W.2d at 94 n.3.

42 Avondale School Dist. Bd. of Educ. (Avondale Fed'n of Teachers), 1968 Mich. L.M.B.
Ops. 518, 525 (trial examiner's opinion).
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Thus, if the exclusive privileges are necessary to the union's performance as the
exclusive bargaining agent, "a rival organization may be denied all organizational
conveniences or advantages except those which are essential to communicating
with employees, such as the right to solicit membership during nonworking hours
on the premises and the right to handbill or distribute literature at certain times
and places. 41 3 Although this appears merely to reiterate the classic labor law
principle announced in Republic Aviation Corp. and Babcock & Wilcox Co.
which vests employees with solicitation and distribution rights absent unusual
circumstances," the Michigan Board applies this principle to a situation where

the privileges granted are determined to be necessary to the majority union in its
bargainingfunction.
The practical impact of the WERC's decision is exemplified in a later order
which repeated the Commission's prohibition of a majority union's exclusive right
to the use of bulletin boards and teacher mailboxes for the posting and distribution of printed matters relating to the internal and organizational activity of the
union.4 5 These materials included membership applications and fliers describing
the union's benefits, philosophy, services, and insurance programs. Such a policy
is not incompatible with an exclusive recognition policy. It is clear "the majority
organization is entitled to certain benefits in order to effectuate and properly
carry out its duties as the majority representative."" A standard which requires
that the special privileges granted enable the exclusive bargaining union to perform its function as such can thus accommodate exclusive recognition and the
protection of minority union's organizational rights.
III. Constitutional Law Considerations
A. First Amendment Speech and Association Rights
A constitutional challenge to the validity of exclusive privileges related to the
communications system of a school is aimed at more than limiting the applications of the cooperation concept. It essentially is aimed at striking down entirely
such privileges as a denial of minority union members' rights of free speech,
association, and equal protection.
It is well established that teachers as well as other public employees do not
relinquish their first amendment rights as a result of the public nature of their
employment.4" But it is equally well established that the exercise of these rights
43 Id.
44 See text accompanying notes 33-37 supra.
45 Milwaukee Teachers Union, Decision No. 9258 (W.E.R.C. Oct. 8, 1969) (decision of
Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, previously called Wisconsin Employment Relations Board).
46 Milwaukee Teachers Union, Decision No. 6995-A at 20 (W.E.R.B. March 24, 1966)
(decision of Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, subsequently called Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission), rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom. Bd. of School Dist. v.
WERC, 42 Wis. 2d 637, 168 N.W.2d 92 (1969).
47 U.S. Const. amend. I provides: "Congress shall make no law . .. abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition
the government for a redress of grievances."
48 Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
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is subject to reasonable regulations just as in the community at large.4 9 The
difficulty arises in arriving at a realistic balance between the interests of the
teacher as a citizen and the interests of the public employer in insuring the
efficient functioning of the public schools as educational institutions."
Employment regulations have been attacked successfully as vague or overbroad deterrents of employees' first amendment rights. In Friedman v. Union
Free School Distgict No. I,"± for example, a New York district court struck down
a school regulation prohibiting distribution of all literature by teachers in all areas
of school premises at all times. Such a regulation violates even basic labor law
principles52 and it is not surprising that the court found a regulation forbidding
a whole range of possible speech without the slightest justification to be an unconstitutionally broad infringement on speech. Once again, however, it should
be noted that the constitution does not bar reasonable regulations.5" The court
specifically acknowledged that the issue of distributing union publication and
other literature on school property is a proper subject of negotiations.54
The court in Friedman partially relied on Los Angeles Teachers Union v.
Los Angeles City Board of Education55 to support its conclusion. In that case
the California Supreme Court held that teachers could not be prohibited from
circulating during duty-free lunch periods on school premises a petition relating
to the financing of public schools. The court reasoned that the disharmony which
naturally results from circulation of a petition on a controversial matter is no
greater than the disharmony inherent in permissible discussion among teachers
of issues raised in the petition. 5 There was no showing that this possible friction
constituted "a clear and substantial threat to order and efficiency in the
schools."57 In light of the fact that "the most effective forum in which and time
at which . . .teachers can communicate . . .are the school premises and the
hours during which teachers are both gathered together there and free to converse with one another,"55 there was no acceptable alternative open to the teachers enabling them to carry on their political activity.59 The court added that the
school board could promulgate regulations of general applicability to protect
teachers from interruptions in faculty rooms and lunchrooms, but "a prohibition
only of interruptions due to circulation of petitions is an unjustifiable discrimination against one type of speech protected by the First Amendment.""0
It has been suggested that the principles of Healy v.James 1 apply to establish that the denial of the use of a school's internal channels of communication
49

Id.; see also, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554 (1965); Healy v. James, 408 U.S.

169, 192-93 (1972).
50 391 U.S. at 568.
51 314 F. Supp. 223 (E.D. N.Y. 1970).
52 See text accompanying notes 33-37 supra.
53 See Wright, The Constitution on Campus, 22 VAND. L. REv. 1027, 1042 (1969); see
also cases cited in note 49 supra.
54 314 F. Supp. at 229.

55
56
57
58
59
60
61

71 Cal. 2d 551. 455 P.2d 827, 78 Cal. Rptr. 723 (1969).
Id. at 561, 455 P.2d at 833, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
Id. at 565, 455 P.2d at 836, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 732.
Id. at 560, 455 P.2d at 833, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
Id.
Id. at 562, 455 P.2d at 834, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 730.
408 U.S. 169 (1972).
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impairs teachers' first amendment protected rights of association to organize and
form unions and of free speech. 2 In that case the Supreme Court held that the
unjustified denial of official recognition to the campus SDS organization at least
indirectly impeded the free association of SDS members by imposing disabilities
which in reality deprived the organization of necessary effective means of communication.6 3 Without official recognition, the organization had no access to
student bulletin boards, the school newspaper and campus meeting places.6 The
court held:
[-]he Constitution's protection is not limited to direct interference with
fundamental rights.... IT]he group's possible ability to exist outside the
campus community does not ameliorate significantly the disabilities imposed
by the [college]
President's action. We are not free to disregard the practical
65
realities.

The finding here of interference with the right of association is rooted in the
deprivation of viable means of communication as a consequence of nonrecognition. For all practical purposes, nonrecognition meant nonexistence for the
organization.
It is not at all clear that one can reasonably conclude from these cases that
the first amendment dictates that school boards must grant to teachers' unions
and their members the use of bulletin boards, internal mail system, mimeograph
machines, and so on. Given the fact that teachers can freely discuss issues among
themselves, engage in political activities," and handbill union literature and
solicit membership on the premises during nonworking hours pursuant to classic
labor law principles," the denial of these conveniences does not prohibit or
present substantial impediments to the exercise of free speech and association.
Means of internal communication within a school which are set up to facilitate
the efficient operation of educational programs do not have to be turned over to
unions to facilitate their organizational activities. These "internal channels of
school communication... are not traditionally of a public nature for the purpose
of furthering goals of ... union[s]. '"" "[T]here exists no right to their use.""e
B. Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Right
Once the school board chooses to grant access to these facilities to the
majority union, the question becomes one of whether or not such disparate treatment violates the fourteenth amendment equal protection clause"0 by arbitrarily
62 Michigan City Fed'n of Teachers, Local 399 v. Michigan City Area Schools, Civil No.
72 S 94 *(N.D. Ind., Jan. 24, 1973).

63
64

408 U.S. at 181.
Id.

65 Id. at 183.
66 E.g., Pickering v. Rd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
67 See text accompanying notes 33-37 supra.
68 314 F. Supp. at 1075.
69 Id. at 1076.
70 U.S. Const. amend. XIV provides: "...
No State shall . . . deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."

[Vol. 49:1064]

NOTES

denying the minority union the same conveniences and advantages in exercising
speech and association rights. This, of course, depends on whether or not the
distinction drawn between the majority exclusive bargaining representative and
the minority union is a justifiable and reasonable classification.
There are traditionally two approaches to the application of the equal protection clause."1 The "deferential old" equal protection applies a rationality test
whereby a classification satisfies constitutional requirements if there exists a
rational relationship between the distinction and constitutionally permissible
objectives."2 On the other hand, there is the "interventionist new" equal protection which requires that a classification be necessary to satisfy a compelling state
interest."3 It is this latter test which is invoked in cases involving fundamental
interests or suspect classifications. 4 The strict scrutiny test is applicable here
where interests of speech and association are involved."
The compelling state interest arguably promoted by disparate treatment of
unions as to special privileges is the effective implementation of an exclusive
representation policy so as to insure labor peace and stability in the vital area
of public education."' It is clear, however, that the mere invocation of a recognized compelling state interest in peace and stability in its public institutions falls
short of satisfying the constitution. The Supreme Court in Tinker v.Des Moines
Independent Community School District77 set forth the standards to be met. Fear
of public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest is insufficient. Rather, school
officials must produce "facts which might reasonably have led [them] to forecast
substantial disruption of or material interference with school activities."78 Absent
such a showing of a substantial threat to the order and efficiency of the schools,
the unions should be accorded equal treatment.
It is interesting to note that the developing "sliding scale" or the "expanded
reasonable means inquiry' 7 also supports the conclusion reached under the strict
scrutiny test. Under the means-focused model, the Court would continue to
demand that the means employed by the government in limiting constitutional
interests be more than reasonable but rather necessary or the least restrictive
80
means.
Equal treatment regarding special privileges does not violate the majority's
status as the exclusive bargaining agent. The fourteenth amendment would not
bar an employer from granting the majority union use of school facilities necessary
to function as the exclusive collective bargaining representative. The equal protection argument focuses on those privileges not directly related to the exclusive
agent's bargaining role which in reality serve to entrench the union's majority
71 See generally Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Forward: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine of a Changing Court: A Model For a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Hev.
L. Rnv. 1 (1972).
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id.

75 Id.
76
77

See, e.g., 314 F. Supp. at 1076.
393 U.S. 503 (1969).

79

Gunther, supra note 71, at 20-48.

78 Id. at 514.
80 Id. at 24.
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status by discriminating against the minority.8 Equal treatment as to those
privileges unrelated to the collective bargaining process provides for the preservation of the exclusive recognition and collective bargaining policies and the protection of the minority union against unlawful discrimination by recognizing the
significant difference between the majority's role as exclusive bargaining agent
and as a rival to a minority competitor.8 2
IV. Conclusion
Because of the special opportunities for the exercise of first amendment
rights in the public institution of public schools,"8 it is important that care be
taken to define and safeguard the rights of a union representing a minority of
public employees. Application of both a limited concept of cooperation borrowed
from classic labor law and of the fourteenth amendment equal protection clause
logically circumscribes the benefits enjoyed by the majority union within the
narrow realm of its exclusive representational duties.8 4 Setting up the bargaining
relationship" as the standard against which the validity of special privileges is
tested takes into account the realities of the dual roles played by the state as
regulator and employer and the exclusive agent as bargaining representative and
as a union attempting to perpetuate and entrench its majority status in the face of
competing minority unions. Furthermore, such an approach recognizes that the
competing policy interests in implementing exclusive recognition in public employment and in protecting the statutory and constitutional rights of minority
unions are not mutually exclusive.88 Both can be effectuated by according equal
treatment to public employee unions in all matters not directly related to the
collective bargaining process.
Marcia M. Gaughan

81 Note, supra note 1, at 1006-07, 1011; see also Commentary, The Public Employe Relations Act and Pennsylvania Teachers: A Legal Analysis in Light of the January, 1971 Pittsburgh Dispute, 10 DUQUESNE L. Rav. 77, 80 (1971).
82 See text accompanying notes 39-46 supra.
83 E.g., 314 F. Supp. at 1074.
84 See text accompanying notes 18-46, 70-82 supra.
85 Note, supra note 1, at 1032.
86 Id. at 1011.

